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Greetings to our viewers from Tehran and welcome to this window from the Iranian capital, as part of our coverage of the early Iranian presidential elections today. As we approach the eve of these elections, voters in Iran will head to the polls tomorrow morning to cast their votes in these early presidential elections. These elections come in the wake of the tragic death of Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash last May. The competition in these elections is fierce, with four candidates in the running. Three of them belonging to the conservative camp and one belonging to the reformist camp. After the withdrawal of candidates Amir-Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi and Ali Reza Zakani, there has been much speculation about the implications of these withdrawals and the expectations in Iran on the eve of the elections.

Joining us from Tehran, we have correspondents from Al Jazeera, Nour al-Din Al-Daghir from Isfahan, Adnan Boreni, and from Tabriz, Omar Hawash. We start with Nour al-Din Al-Daghir from Tehran, on the eve of the elections, and the question on everyone’s mind after the withdrawals of Hashemi and Zakani is whether there could be further withdrawals from the conservative candidates, creating a shift in dynamics.

Recent reports suggest that there was a meeting involving the conservative camp, particularly the Coalition Council of the Revolutionary Forces, known as “Shen,” which is a coalition of conservative factions. There was a meeting attended by both Ghalibaf and Jalili, but it seems that discussions on potential withdrawals did not lead to any concrete outcomes. This was the second meeting following yesterday’s meeting in Mashhad, and now in Tehran. However, moments ago, Jalili confirmed in a tweet that he would continue in the electoral race. Similarly, Ghalibaf’s campaign manager confirms that he too will continue. This indicates that the door for withdrawals has been firmly closed, and the main competition is set to commence tomorrow morning at eight o’clock between the four main candidates.

If we delve deeper into the situation, it appears that three significant candidates are emerging, at least according to opinion polls, obtaining significant percentages. Bazargan represents the reformist camp, Jalili is seen as representing the conservative revolutionary camp, and Ghalibaf, the parliament speaker, is practically categorized here as part of the new conservatives. This division sets the stage for the impending competition, with the focus primarily on these three candidates.

Moving to Tabriz, the hometown of Bazargan, we have Adnan Boreni. The withdrawals, or rather the insistence of the main candidates from the conservative camp, namely Jalili and Ghalibaf, to run raises questions about how Masoud Bazargan and his electoral base will fare. The significant electoral force of the reformist camp is crucial in this scenario. For Bazargan, he needs more than 50% of the votes to secure the presidency in Tehran. Latest opinion polls suggest that Bazargan has garnered around 33%, with Jalili at 29% and Ghalibaf at 19%. If these numbers translate into actual votes in tomorrow’s elections and results are announced on Saturday, Tehran could be heading for a runoff round of the Iranian presidential elections.

Polls indicate that this runoff could potentially be between Bazargan and one of the main conservative candidates, either Jalili or Ghalibaf. Indeed, Bazargan might not have envisioned competing fiercely against the stalwarts of the conservative camp, including Ghalibaf, the current parliament speaker, and Jalili, the representative of the Iranian Supreme Leader at the National Security Council. However, it is the overwhelming support Bazargan has received from the reformist camp, led by figures like Mohammad Khatami, the former president, Hassan Rouhani, and even the renowned former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, that has placed him as a formidable contender against the conservatives.

The comprehensive support Bazargan has garnered from these influential figures has positioned him as a tough competitor against the conservative contenders. There are indications that the reformist camp is backing a united front under Bazargan, whereas the conservative camp is more divided between Ghalibaf and Jalili. The electoral landscape is certainly intense, and the turnout will play a crucial role in defining the outcome of the first round of elections in Tehran.

If we shift our focus to Isfahan, we have Adnan Boreni on the ground. Isfahan witnessed a relatively low turnout in the previous elections, not exceeding 44%. Does Isfahan appear polarized amidst the current competition between the reformists and conservatives? Indeed, as we arrived in the city yesterday, we noticed an intense election campaign with candidates engaging with the public extensively, more so than even in the capital, Tehran. The enthusiasm for participation in the elections was palpable, with citizens actively voicing their opinions and concerns on electoral programs and issues they wish to prioritize, signaling a high engagement despite previous low turnouts.

Indeed, the upcoming elections in Isfahan are crucial, given the city’s economic significance in Iran, particularly in sectors like steel and military industries. Thank you, Adnan Boreni, for your insights from Isfahan. Furthermore, looking at foreign policy, one of the most critical areas for the next president is how they navigate Iran’s relations with the international community.

While Arab-Iranian relations have shown signs of improvement in recent years, there are still disputes between Tehran and Washington, as well as Western countries, over Iran’s nuclear program and other issues. The ongoing discord has pushed Iran towards strengthening ties with Russia and China, as well as joining alliances aligned with them. Recent developments suggest a shift in Iran’s foreign policy towards the East, as Tehran aims to mitigate repercussions from Western disagreements and engage in a multipolar world.

This change entails more robust relations with Russia and China, evidenced by the strategic agreement with China and another scheduled with Russia. The coordination and cooperation have translated into unified political stances internationally, highlighting that any upcoming shifts are unlikely to impact Moscow and Beijing’s support towards Iran. This strategic shift positions Iran strategically and broadens its international engagement as it navigates post-Israeli-Palestinian conflict dynamics.

From Beijing’s tremendous investment in the region post-conflict, the first step towards normalizing relations between Tehran and Riyadh amidst the funeral processions of Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi, attended by multiple Arab delegations. This suggests an impending improvement in Iran’s relations with Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, showing promising prospects for amelioration. Positive developments are also forecasted for Iran’s ties with Egypt, indicating the potential for Iran to expand its relations with Arab states not previously engaged.

Such shifts and growing engagements reflect Tehran’s efforts to create new equations with neighboring states and reshape its international posture moving forward. Despite expressing concerns over Arab-Israeli normalization, Tehran showcased its intent to counteract Israel by participating in operations supporting the resistance in Palestine, signaling a new deterrent strategy. This Iranian approach to the region could influence political equations significantly, as Iran solidifies its foothold in a multipolar world.

Returning to Tehran, speculation arises on how the next president, especially Bazargan, could affect Iran’s foreign policy. If successful, would there be a change in Iran’s foreign policy from the days of former President Raisi? A substantial transformation may not be anticipated but a nuanced shift in direction likely. Dr. Bazargan’s presidency is expected to align with the reformist political discourse of former Presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hashemi Rafsanjani. This political inclination sets the stage for a more conciliatory approach towards Europe and improving ties with neighboring countries.

Conversely, if one of the conservative candidates, Jalili or Ghalibaf, wins, it is not a given that Iran will enter a standoff with the West. Any incoming president will engage in negotiations, albeit within a revised framework. The negotiation framework will naturally differ based on the president, with distinctions expected even between Ghalibaf and Jalili’s approaches. The adherence to a consistent negotiation framework is paramount, considering the hurdles posed by the existing legislation and the Security Council oversight.

It is critical to acknowledge that the nuclear issue now falls under the purview of the National Security Council, surpassing the domain of the Foreign Ministry. Hence, any future negotiations would have to align with and obtain the approval of both bodies. This transfer of responsibility is aimed at depoliticizing and safeguarding the nuclear issue from external influences, ensuring compliance with the directives of Iranian decision-makers. The upcoming president, regardless of political affiliation, must factor in these challenges while forging a coherent foreign policy strategy.

Lastly, as the regional landscape undergoes shifts, particularly amidst the events in Gaza and discussions around the Resistance Axis, questions arise about Bazargan’s stance on unity among resistance factions and his alignment with the Resistance Axis. Does Bazargan believe in a unified front or endorse the current approach of the Resistance Axis in addressing ongoing events? The election of Bazargan could potentially tilt the balance towards a political discourse similar to that of former President Khatami, redirecting Iran’s regional stance towards unity while preserving its distinctive standing within the Resistance Axis.

In conclusion, the implications of the upcoming elections on Iranian foreign policy and regional dynamics remain significant, shaping the trajectory for Iran’s engagement with the international community and its regional alliances. Thank you to Mr. Shams Al-Wa’zin and Dr. Fatima Samadi for joining us today. Thank you for tuning in, and we look forward to keeping you informed. See you later tonight for another update from Tehran.

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يتوجه الناخبون في إيران غدًا صباحًا إلى مراكز الاقتراع للإدلاء بأصواتهم في الانتخابات الرئاسية المبكرة التي تأتي بعد وفاة الرئيس الإيراني إبراهيم رئيسي في حادث تحطم مروحيته في الشهر الماضي. ويتنافس الآن أربعة مرشحين على منصب الرئيس، نظرًا لانسحاب مرشحين اثنين من التيار المحافظ.

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